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Abstract The Clean Air Act (CAA) requires listing as
criteria air pollutants those pollutants that arise from
multiple sources and are found across the United States.
The original list included carbon monoxide, nitrogen
oxides, sulfur oxides, particulate matter, photochemical
oxidants (later regulated as ozone), and hydrocarbons.
Later, the listing of hydrocarbons was revoked and lead
was listed. The CAA requires the EPA Administrator to set
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for
these pollutants using the “latest scientific knowledge” at
levels that, in the judgment of the Administrator, are
“requisite to protect public health” while “allowing an
adequate margin of safety” without considering the cost of
implementing the NAAQS. The NAAQS are set using
scientific knowledge to inform the Administrator’s policy
judgments on each NAAQS. Recently, there has been
increasing tension and debate over the role of scientific
knowledge versus policy judgment in the setting of
NAAQS. This paper reviews key elements of this debate
drawing on the opinion of Supreme Court Justice Stephen
Breyer, in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations,
to resolve the conundrum posed by the CAA language.
I conclude that scientists should carefully distinguish
between their interpretations of scientific knowledge on
specific pollutants and their personal preferences as to a
given policy outcome (i.e., specific level and form of the
NAAQS), recognizing that these are policy judgments as to
acceptable levels of risk if the science does not identify a
threshold level below which there are no identifiable health
risks. These policy judgments are exclusively delegated by
the CAA to the EPA Administrator who needs to articulate
the basis for their policy judgments on the level and form
of the NAAQS and associated level of acceptable risk.
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Introduction
In this paper, I briefly review key aspects of the Clean Air
Act (1970) with regard to the setting of National Ambient
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for criteria pollutants
noting various landmark decisions. I address the primary or
health-based Standards and do not consider the secondary
or welfare-based Standards, although the core concepts are
also relevant to the setting of the secondary Standards. I
highlight actions of the last two EPA Administrators
(Stephen Johnson and Lisa Jackson) and the Clean Air
Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) related to the
setting of NAAQS for particulate matter and ozone that
serve to illustrate the growing tension and debate over the
role of scientific knowledge and policy judgments in the
setting of NAAQS. I conclude with recommendations for
the role of CASAC in synthesizing and interpreting the
science on criteria pollutants and offering scientific advice
that informs the EPA Administrator’s policy judgments on
acceptable health risks that, in turn, are linked to the level
and statistical form of the NAAQS primary Standard.
This paper was presented in the concluding plenary session on
“Regulatory and Policy Implications” at the “American Association
for Aerosol Research International Specialty Conference: Air
Pollution and Health: Bridging the Gap from Sources to Health
Outcomes,” March 22–26, 2010, San Diego, CA.
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The Clean Air Act (CAA), initially passed in 1963, is the
principal national statute in the United States concerned
with air quality. The original CAA (1963) directed the then
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to
prepare, “compile and publish criteria on the effects of air
pollutants,” hence the identification of “criteria pollutants”
and “criteria documents” summarizing the scientific knowl-
edge on certain air pollutants arising from multiple sources
and found across the United States as a basis for Standard
setting. The National Air Pollution Control Administration
(NAPCA) within HEW was assigned responsibility for
administering the CAA. When the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) was created in 1970, responsibil-
ity for administering the CAA was transferred from
NAPCA to the new agency. Bachmann (2007) provides
an in-depth review of the evolution of Air Quality
Management in the United States from 1900 through
2006, with emphasis on the NAAQS, for those readers
interested in an in-depth coverage of the topic. John
Bachmann prepared his historical review soon after he
retired from EPA’s Office of Air Quality Planning and
Standards where he had a central role for more than
three decades in the setting of NAAQS for all the
criteria pollutants. Readers interested in legal details of
the CAA will find the summary of Martineau and
Novello (2004)u s e f u l .
In 1970, amendments to the CAA (1970) were passed
that required the listing of air pollutants that “may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health and
welfare” and to issue air quality criteria for them. These air
quality criteria are to “accurately reflect the latest scientific
knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of all
identifiable effects on public health or welfare which may
be expected from the presence of [a] pollutant in the
ambient air, in varying quantities.”
The pollutants originally designated as “criteria pollutants”
because of their ubiquitous distribution and potential to
endanger health were photochemical oxidants (later regulated
as ozone), particulate matter (later regulated as total sus-
pended particulates, then as PM10,a n dP M 2.5), carbon
monoxide, sulfur oxides (regulated as sulfur dioxide),
nitrogen oxides (regulated as NO2), and non-methane
hydrocarbons (later dropped as a criteria pollutant). The
EPA (1971) established NAAQS for these pollutants, soon
after the Agency was created, using existing scientific
documentation, i.e., criteria. As I will discuss below, the
EPA later added lead as a criteria pollutant with legal
prodding from the National Resources Defense Council.
In 1977, several key amendments were made to the CAA
(1977). Concern about slow action of the EPA in preparing
criteria documents and reassessing NAAQSs prompted a
legislated requirement that the NAAQSs be reevaluated not
later than January 1, 1980, and at 5-year intervals thereafter.
Reevaluation was not intended to automatically result in
changes in the NAAQSs for a pollutant; rather, reevaluation
was intended to ensure that the scientific database was
reviewed and that the NAAQSs were consistent with
current knowledge. To my knowledge, this requirement
for mandatory review every 5 years is unique to the setting
of the NAAQS in the United States. Indeed, I know of no
other statute calling for an updating of the science and
reconsideration of the Standard every 5 years.
Peer review of the earliest criteria documents prepared
by the EPA was carried out by various committees of the
agency’s Science Advisory Board as I will discuss later.
A 1977 amendment to the CAA institutionalized the
peer-review process for the NAAQS (CAA 1977). The
amendment requires the EPA Administrator to appoint an
independent scientific committee, composed of seven
members, including at least one member of the National
Academy of Sciences, one physician, and one person
representing state air pollution control agencies to advise
the Administrator on the science informing the policy
judgments made in setting the NAAQS. The EPA has
implemented this provision of the CAA by appointing a
Committee, which designated itself as the CASAC. The
CASAC is directly responsible to the EPA Administrator,
although it functions administratively as one of the
standing committees of the EPA Science Advisory Board.
Traditionally, the requirement for one CASAC member to
be a member of the National Academy of Sciences has
been broadly interpreted to also include membership in
either the National Academy of Engineering or the
Institute of Medicine. To complement the expertise of
regular members of the CASAC, consultants with specialized
expertise usually have been added to the review panels for
specific pollutants.
The CAA was amended again in 1990 (CAA 1990).
Although major changes were made in the CAA with these
amendments, especially with regard to the regulation of
hazardous air pollutants, there were no changes in the
fundamental approach to dealing with the setting of
NAAQS for criteria pollutants. However, there were
changes in the CAA that have had major impact on the
regulation of emissions of PM and precursors especially
from large power plants.
National Ambient Air Quality Standards
Section 109 of the CAA (1970) directs the Administrator to
propose and promulgate “primary” and “secondary”
NAAQSs for criteria pollutants identified under Section
108. The primary Standards are to be set to protect public
health; secondary Standards are to be set to protect the
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visibility, and deterioration of property. In this paper, I
focus on the use of scientific knowledge and judgment in
the setting of the primary Standards. However, the issues
discussed are also broadly applicable to the setting of
secondary Standards.
Section 109(b)(1) defines a primary NAAQS as one that
“the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment
of the Administrator, based on the criteria and allowing an
adequate margin of safety, is requisite to protect the public
health.” The margin of safety, as interpreted by the EPA, is
intended to address uncertainties associated with inconclu-
sive scientific and technical information at the time the
Standard is set and to account for hazards that research has
not yet identified.
The primary Standards are intended to protect against
“adverse effects, not necessarily against all identifiable
effects of changes produced by a pollutants.” Although
Congress did not rigorously define an adverse effect, it did
provide general guidance in the legislative history of the
debate on the CAA (Library of Congress 1974). Congress
was concerned with effects ranging from cancer, metabolic
and respiratory disease, and impairment of mental processes
to headaches, dizziness, and nausea.
Congress also noted concern for sensitive population
groups in setting the NAAQSs. In particular, Congress
noted that the Standards should protect “particularly
sensitive citizens such as bronchial asthmatics and those
with emphysema who in the normal course of daily activity
are exposed to the ambient environment.” This has been
interpreted to exclude individuals who are not performing
normal activities, such as individuals who are hospital-
ized. Further guidance was given noting that the
Standard is statutorially sufficient whenever there is “an
absence of adverse effect on the health of a statistically
related sample of persons in sensitive groups from
exposure to the ambient air.”
The challenge of interpreting the language of the
CAA was noted in an editorial by Donald Kennedy on
“Risk versus Risk” published when he served as Editor-
in-Chief of Science (Kennedy 2005). He wrote—“In the
United States and some other industrial democracies,
where people and their governments tend to be risk
averse, legislatures, courts, and administrative entities
usually create a presumption favoring more safety rather
than less. The definitions of risk in law are often vague
(“reasonable certainty of no harm” or “adequate margin
of safety”) and are likely to encourage an unrealistic
belief that risks can be minimized or even eliminated
altogether.” I think Kennedy has captured the conundrum
posed by the language of the CAA, a conundrum that has
been addressed by Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer
as I will relate later.
Standard-setting process
The process for developing and issuing NAAQS is quite
complex. Key elements of the process, as used until quite
recently, include preparation and review of (a) criteria
document, (b) staff paper, (c) more recently a risk
assessment, and (d) a regulatory decision package leading
to the Administrator’s policy judgment decisions as to the
proposed and final NAAQS which are published in the
Federal Register. Traditionally, CASAC focused its
attention on reviewing the Criteria Documents and Staff
Papers and, more recently, a formal Risk Assessment. As
an aside, the process was changed at the end of 2006
(Peacock 2006) with an Integrated Science Assessment
and Policy Assessment Document replacing the Criteria
Document and Staff Paper. Time will tell if these changes
really improve the overall process.
In addition to the documents noted above, the Agency
now prepares a Regulatory Impact Analysis which is
required under Executive Order 12866 issued by President
Clinton (1993) that applies to economically significant rules
that have “an annual effect on the economy of $100 million
or more or adversely effect in a material way the economy,
a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the
environment, public health or safety or site, local, or tribal
governments or communities.” The Regulatory Impact
Analysis is not considered during the NAAQS rulemaking
process given the prohibition of consideration of cost in the
setting of the NAAQS, as will be discussed later.
The first Criteria Document prepared and released by the
EPA addressed lead as a criteria air pollutant. This
document was prepared and the review initiated before a
Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee was mandated by
the CAA Amendments of 1977. Lead was not one of the
original criteria pollutants. In 1975, the Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC), with legal leadership from
Attorney David Schoenbrod, sued EPA to have lead listed
as a criteria pollutant. The EPA argued that it was already
dealing effectively with reducing lead in air through its
program to remove lead from gasoline. The Second Circuit
Court disagreed (NRDC v. Train 1976) and on March 1,
1976, ordered EPA to identify lead as a criteria pollutant
and begin the process of developing a NAAQS. At the
time, EPA’s Science Advisory Board (SAB) was in the
process of assuming review responsibility for scientific
activities across the Agency consolidating review functions
brought to EPA from its predecessor organizations such as
the National Air Pollution Control Administration
(NAPCA). The EPA had just disbanded the National Air
Quality Criteria Advisory Committee which had operated
under NAPCA as well as other media specific advisory
committees in favor of a series of discipline-oriented
Committees; e.g., health, engineering and ecology.
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Committee, to chair an ad hoc Committee to review the
criteria document on lead. Preparation of this document had
already been initiated by EPA in anticipation of the Second
Circuit Court decision. It was prepared by a Criteria and
Special Studies Office within the Office of Research and
Development located at EPA’s Health Effects Laboratory in
Research Triangle Park, NC. The first draft, released
November 18, 1976, was viewed as unacceptable by the
Ad Hoc Committee. The Committee was concerned with
the poor scientific quality of the document. In addition, as
noted by Bachmann (2007), the Committee was concerned
that the document recommended a specific numerical
Standard, a value of 5 μg/m
3, which was inconsistent with
the intent of the CAA to separate the scientific assessment
of the relevant criteria and the setting of the specific
NAAQS.
The views of the Ad Hoc Committee members varied.
Indeed, some members wanted the Committee to assume
responsibility for re-writing the Criteria Document and
recommending a specific Standard. As Chair, I emphasized
our role was advisory to the Administrator, not to serve as
substitutes for EPA staff to prepare the Criteria Document.
The EPA proceeded to prepare a second draft which was
released on May 27, 1977. The Committee viewed it as
improved, but felt it was still not adequate for setting a lead
Standard. The Agency proceeded to develop a third draft
released on August 22, 1977. The Committee offered
modest comments on the third draft which were considered
by the Agency as it prepared the final criteria document
releasedonDecember14,1977(EPA1977a) which served as
a basis for the proposed lead NAAQS (EPA 1977b). As
Chair, I conveyed to the Agency the view that the final
version—“accurately reflected the available scientific litera-
ture and provided an adequate scientific basis for promulga-
tion and issuance of a Standard for airborne lead.” The first
lead NAAQS was issued in 1978 (EPA 1978).
The experience with the lead criteria document served as
a stimulus for EPA to create a separate Environmental
Criteria Assessment Office within the Agency’s Office of
Research and Development. For three decades, this office
was headed by Lester Grant. Grant originally came to the
EPA from the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill as
an Inter-Government Personnel Act assignee to assist with
revision of the criteria document on lead.
As noted by Bachmann (2007), the Office of Air Quality
Planning and Standards (OAQPS) prepared an analysis to
support the Lead Standard which was reviewed by EPA
scientists, policymakers and the public. However, it was not
reviewed by the SAB Ad Hoc Committee. That analysis
served as a basis for the proposed NAAQS for lead (EPA
1977b) and the final lead NAAQS (EPA 1978). Bachmann
(2007) has noted—“As for all NAAQS decisions, the final
choice on the Standard was constrained and informed by
the scientific information, but ultimately based on the
policy judgment of a politically responsible decision-maker,
the EPA Administrator. After consideration of and reaction
to public comments, and review and discussion on the final
package by OMB, the Administrator promulgated a Pb
Standard of 1.5 μg/m
3 quarterly average in TSP.” I strongly
agree with Bachmann’s first sentence assessment of the role
of scientific information informing the policy judgments of
the EPA Administrator. This will be a recurring theme in
the remainder of this paper.
In many ways, the experience EPA gained in setting
the lead NAAQS influenced the NAAQS process for
subsequent NAAQS decisions. The OAQPS analysis
evolved into preparation of formal Staff Papers that
would be subjected to review by the CASAC. The first
activity of the newly created CASAC, initially chaired by
Sheldon Friedlander, was the review of a combined
criteria document for particulate matter and Sulfur
Oxides. Subsequently, separate addenda were prepared
for Sulfur Oxides and particulate matter and separate
Standards issued for the two pollutants. Sulfur Dioxide
was identified as the indicator for Sulfur Oxides and
Total Suspended Particulate (TSP) as the indicator for
particulate matter.
Without going into the administrative or legal details, it
is important to note that EPA, in carrying out mandated
NAAQS actions in the early days, used an “informal
rulemaking process” to propose and promulgate Standards
(Bachmann 2007). The informal process focused on the end
product, the NAAQS. The process was not always well
documented as to how decisions were reached on the four
elements of each NAAQS; the indicator, averaging time,
specific numerical concentration and the statistical form.
The DC Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently found that
the record of this informal process did not give the Court a
sufficient basis to complete its judicial review of the rules
that were promulgated. This led to the final rule for the
secondary Sulfur Dioxide Standard being revoked in 1973
as recounted by Berry (1984) in his review of NAAQS
decision-making. This judicial decision led EPA to develop
more rigorous procedures, including documentation, for the
setting of each NAAQS (Pedersen 1975). As noted by
Bachmann (2007), these procedures addressed the follow-
ing points: “(1) EPAwas to make available to the public the
information and technical methodologies it relied upon by
the time of proposal; (2) the preambles to proposal and final
rulesweretoprovideadetailedexplanationofEPA’sde ci si on ;
(3)EPAwasrequiredtorespondtoall“significant” comments
onthe proposalbythe timeitissuesits final rule; and (4) all of
the above documents, analyses, preambles, and responses
constituted the record that the court would examine in
reviewing the final Standard decision. Objections not raised
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aspeedyNAAQSprocesswereover.”Iagreethatthespeedof
the process was reduced, however, I would add that the
transparency of the process was also substantially improved.
Congress apparently agreed and these provisions were
substantially codified by the CAA Amendments of 1977.
EPA’s implementation of the CAA, especially its setting of
NAAQS even with improved documentation, has been a
matter of continuing controversy and litigation (some persons
might argue that controversy and litigation were enhanced by
improved documentation in the record). Bachmann (2007)
summarizes many of the key legal cases in his review. In this
paper, I will only highlight certain of the key legal cases.
The 1997 revisions of the Ozone NAAQS (EPA 1997a)
and Particulate Matter NAAQS (EPA 1997b) proved to be
very contentious, including the discussions within CASAC.
The CASAC PM Panel members had a range of views on
the PM2.5 Standard that was being set for the first time
supplementing the PM10 Standard. This range of views was
clearly articulated in the CASAC Chair’s letter (Wolff
1996) to the Administrator by including a Table showing
the views of each individual.
The contentious nature of the debate over these revised
NAAQS prompted Administrator Browner to involve
President Clinton. Bachmann (2007) recounts that Admin-
istrator Browner had a 1-h meeting on these Standards with
the President—“she reported that the President quickly
accepted her decision and spent much of the time
discussing how to reduce unnecessary burdens in the
implementation process. This resulted in some of us writing
the first draft of a letter that was later sent by President
Clinton (Clinton 1997) to EPA directing implementation be
carried out so as to “maximize common sense, flexibility,
and cost effectiveness.”” Not surprisingly, President
Clinton (New York 1997)h a dar o l ei na n n o u n c i n gt h e
tighter Standards which included for the first time a
separate PM2.5 Standard to supplement the PM10 Standard
and a shift from a 1-h averaging time to an 8-h averaging
time Standard for Ozone.
The issuance of a revised PM NAAQS triggered the case
of American Trucking Associations v. EPA (ATA 1999). The
Court found “the growing empirical evidence demonstrat-
ing a relationship between fine particle pollution and
adverse health effects amply justifies establishment of
new fine particulate Standards.” The Court went on to find
“ample support” for EPA’s decision to regulate coarse
particulate pollution, but vacated the 1997 PM10 Standards,
concluding in part that PM10 is a “poorly matched indicator
for coarse particulate pollution” because it includes fine
particulates which were separately regulated as PM2.5.
Subsequently, EPA removed the vacated 1997 PM10
Standard allowing the 1987 PM10 Standard to remain in
place along with the new PM2.5.
In addition, the three judge panel held, two to one, that
EPA’s approach to setting the level of the PM and Ozone
Standards in 1997 effected “an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative authority.” The Judicial Panel found that “the
factors EPA uses in determining the degree of public health
concern associated with different levels of ozone and
particulate matter are reasonable.” However, it remanded
the rule to EPA. The Judicial Panel stated that when the
Agency considers these factors for potential non-threshold
pollutants “what EPA lacks is any determinate criterion for
drawing lines” to determine the level at which the Standards
should be set. The Judicial Panel also found that the
Administrator, under the CAA, is not permitted to consider
the cost of implementing these Standards in setting them.
Not surprisingly, the nature of the Circuit Court opinion
resulted in cross appeals being filed on the several issues.
The Supreme Court in February 2001 issued a unanimous
opinion upholding EPA’s position on both the Constitu-
tional and cost issues (Whitman v. American Trucking
Associations 2001). On the Constitutional issue, the
Supreme Court held that the statutory requirement that the
NAAQS be “requisite” to protect public health with an
adequate margin of safety sufficiently guided EPA’s
discretion, affirming EPA’s approach of setting Standards
that are neither more nor less stringent than necessary.
Supreme Court Justice Breyer, who participated in the
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations Case, is well
known and highly regarded for his opinions and writings
on risk assessment and regulation (Breyer 1982, 1993).
Thus, it is not surprising that he took the opportunity in
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations (2001) to offer
comments on the Standard-setting process and, specifically,
the identification of the level of the NAAQS and the
associated level of health risk. While concurring that EPA
cannot consider the costs of implementing the NAAQS, he
went on to note—this interpretation of §109 does not
require the EPA to eliminate every health risk, however
slight, at any economic cost, however great, to the point of
“hurtling” industry over “the brink of ruin,” or even forcing
“deindustrialization.” (Id. At 494; Breyer, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment; citations omitted). Rather,
as Justice Breyer explained:
“The statute, by its express terms, does not compel
the elimination of all risk; and it grants the Admin-
istrator sufficient flexibility to avoid setting ambient
air quality Standards ruinous to industry.
Section 109(b)(1) directs the Administrator to set
Standards that are “requisite to protect the public
health” with “an adequate margin of safety.” But these
words do not describe a world that is free of all risk—
an impossible and undesirable objective (citation
omitted). Nor are the words “requisite” and “public
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consider football equipment “safe” even if its use
entails a level of risk that would make drinking water
“unsafe” for consumption. And what counts as
“requisite” to protecting the public health will
similarly vary with background circumstances, such
as the public’s ordinary tolerance of the particular
health risk in the particular context at issue. The
Administrator can consider such background circum-
stances when “deciding what risks are acceptable in
the world in which we live.” (citation omitted).
The statute also permits the Administrator to take
account of comparative health risks. That is to say,
she may consider whether a proposed rule promotes
safety overall. A rule likely to cause more harm to
health than it prevents is not a rule that is “requisite to
protect the public health.” For example, as the Court
of Appeals held and the parties do not contest, the
Administrator has the authority to determine to what
extent possible health risks stemming from reductions
in tropospheric ozone (which, it is claimed, helps
prevent cataracts and skin cancer) should be taken
into account in setting the ambient air quality
Standard for ozone. (citation omitted).
The statute ultimately specifies that the Standard set
must be “requisite to protect the public health”“ in the
judgment of the Administrator,” §109(b)(1), 84 Stat.
1680 (emphasis added), a phrase that grants the
Administrator considerable discretionary Standard-
setting authority.
The statute’s words, then, authorize the Administrator
to consider the severity of a pollutant’s potential
adverse health effects, the number of those likely to
be affected, the distribution of the adverse effects, and
the uncertainties surrounding each estimate (citation
omitted). They permit the Administrator to take
account of comparative health consequences. They
allow her to take account of context when determin-
ing the acceptability of small risks to health. And they
give her considerable discretion when she does so.
The discretion would seem sufficient to avoid the
extreme results that some of the industry parties fear.
After all, the EPA, in setting Standards that “protect
the public health” with “an adequate margin of
safety,” retains discretionary authority to avoid regu-
lating risks that it reasonably concludes are trivial in
context. Nor need regulation lead to deindustrializa-
tion. Pre-industrial society was not a very healthy
society; hence a Standard demanding the return of the
Stone Age would not prove “requisite to protect the
public health.”
Although I rely more heavily than does the Court
upon legislative history and alternative sources of
statutory flexibility. I reach the same ultimate conclu-
sion, Section 109 does not delegate to the EPA
authority to base the national ambient air quality
Standards, in whole or in part, upon the economic
costs of compliance.”
The case of Whitman v. American Trucking Associations
(2001) is widely cited for the conclusion that EPA cannot
consider the economic costs of compliance in the setting of
NAAQS. Unfortunately, in my opinion, insufficient atten-
tion is given to the thoughtful guidance of Justice Breyer on
exercising policy judgment in deciding on an acceptable
level of health risk, a judgment that in turn determines
the level and statistical form of each NAAQS. It is
interesting that Justice Breyer’s opinion appeared in
Administrator Johnson’s notice of the Ozone NAAQS
(EPA 2008), but did not appear in Administrator Jackson’s
“reconsideration” proposal for ozone (EPA 2010a)w h i c h
will be discussed later.
Paradigm shift
At this juncture, it is appropriate to note that it is my view
that a paradigm shift has taken place in the use of scientific
knowledge and policy judgments in the selection of the
level and form of each NAAQS over the past four decades.
In my opinion, the paradigm shift has been driven in part
by the nature of the growing body of scientific evidence of
pollution effects. In the 1970s, most scientists and
regulators viewed the criteria pollutants as having a
threshold in the concentration–response relationship for
non-cancer endpoints, the major concern for the criteria
pollutants. This was different than the prevailing view for
cancer causing agents which were assumed to have linear,
non-threshold, concentration–response relationships.
In the early 1970s, the available data on each criteria
pollutant were quite modest, with attention in the review
process focusing on only a few epidemiological studies. For
those few studies, attention often focused on whether a
relative risk on the order of 2.0 was observed and whether it
was statistically significant or not. For a given criteria
pollutant there were few, if any, controlled human exposure
studies. The data from laboratory animal studies had
frequently been acquired in short-term studies with expo-
sure concentrations much higher than ambient concentra-
tions. This raised questions about extrapolation from
laboratory animals to humans and high to low exposure
concentrations. The general approach taken to evaluating
the published studies was to identify the lowest levels
where effects were statistically significant and assume this
was the inflection point in the concentration–response
relationship. It could then be readily argued that setting
the Standard at a lower concentration than that at which
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adequate margin of safety.”
In contrast, the most recent reviews of the criteria
pollutants have involved thousands of papers with obser-
vations ranging from the human population level to studies
of intact laboratory animals to studies of effects of air
pollutants on cells and molecules. Despite the huge number
of published studies, the focus has ultimately centered in
the Staff Paper on the results of a few studies where
attention turns to the relevance of the results for informing
policy judgments on the level and statistical form of the
Standard. For the epidemiological studies, the debate often
focuses on whether relative risks of less than 1.1 for excess
morbidity and mortality are significant. Of course, the
specific relative risk number is dependent on the denomi-
nator being used. For controlled exposure clinical studies,
attention has focused on the lowest levels with statistically
significant changes and whether the changes are adverse.
A news report (Taube 1995) in Science, that I view as a
classic report, highlighted the issues involved in the search
for subtle links between diet, lifestyle, or environmental
factors and disease, especially using retrospective observa-
tional studies. I especially liked the quote at the end
attributed to UCLA Professor Greenland in offering
advice to his “most sensible, level-headed, estimatable
colleagues.” Remember, he says—“there is nothing sinful
about going out and getting evidence, like asking people
how much do you drink and checking breast cancer
records. There’s nothing sinful about seeing if that
evidence correlates. There’s nothing sinful about check-
ing for confounding variables. The sin comes in
believing a casual hypothesis is true because your study
came up with a positive result, or believing the opposite
because your study was negative.”
It is interesting to note that CASAC discussions of
criteria pollutant effects have frequently focused initially on
the level of the Standard, devoid of any consideration of the
statistical form of the level. This approach was in keeping
with traditional practice in the setting of Standards such as
Threshold Limit Values for occupational exposures to
chemicals (McClellan 1999, 2010c). That approach has
traditionally involved a review of the available human data
on a toxic chemical to determine a no-observed effect level,
or the lowest observed effect level, and then use of a safety
factor to arrive at an acceptable exposure level set at a
lower level. In the absence of adequate human data,
laboratory animal data are used and an additional safety
factor applied to account for the potential that the animal
observations might not adequately predict human effects.
This approach was routinely used for a wide range of health
responses that were assumed to have an exposure-response
relationship that exhibited either a true or practical
threshold, an excess of effects above some level and an
absence of effects below that level. A review of the earliest
Criteria Documents and, indeed, also the Staff Papers,
documents that a similar line of reasoning was used in
the setting of the NAAQS—identify levels where an
increase in effects is observed and then set the Standard
at a lower level.
The implementation of Standards set with this approach
soon revealed that if the Standard was to be rigorously
enforced, i.e., no exceedances of the specific level of the
Standard, the practical effect would be to cause average
levels of the pollutant to be reduced to levels far below the
Standard so as to avoid the occasional high concentration
exceeding the Standard. Fortunately, common sense pre-
vailed and the EPA, over time, moved to the practice of
routinely linking attainment of the specific level of the
Standard to a statistical form such as the 98th percentile
24-h concentration averaged over 3 years, or the fourth
highest 8-h average concentration during a 3-year period. In
my experience, most of the attention of the CASAC in the
NAAQS-setting process has focused on the level of the
Standard with limited discussion of the statistical form of
the Standard. In doing so, there has been a failure to
recognize that the stringency of the Standard and the degree
of health protection provided depends on both the level and
statistical form of the Standard for a particular indicator and
averaging time. In fact, there have been occasions when
CASAC has deliberated at length on the level of a
prospective Standard and, then in a casual manner, turned
its attention to what would be the appropriate statistical
form for that level. That this is the case is not surprising
since few scientific papers discuss the implications of the
reported results in terms of the frequency with which a
given health effect may be observed.
The challenges of selecting appropriate averaging times
and statistical forms for the NAAQS are substantial. The
original epidemiological and toxicological studies that
provide the scientific information that should inform the
setting of the NAAQS do not always report results with an
averaging time that is the same as used for the Standard.
Hence, the need to make extrapolations from results
reported based on one metric, such as average daily
exposure, to second metric, such as an 8-h or shorter
averaging time. The setting of Standards at extreme values,
the 98th percentile for NO2 (EPA 2010b) and the 99th
percentile form as done with the 1-h averaging time
Standard for SO2 (EPA 2010c), results in extremely
stringent Standards that at best are only very loosely related
to the underlying data.
In my view, decisions on the selection of specific levels
and averaging times for the NAAQS are policy judgments
properly reserved to the Administrator informed by the
available scientific knowledge. In the 1990s, concurrent
with the increasingly widespread use of formal risk analysis
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moved to quantify the health benefits associated with
setting the NAAQS at various levels, with an associated
statistical form. I must admit to being an early advocate of
formal quantification of health benefits of various levels
and forms of the prospective Standards. I viewed the
approach then and I still do today, as a way to synthesize
the science so it could provide useful guidance to the
Administrator for making policy decisions. I did not
envision that some advocates of quantitative risk analysis
would actually view the results of the analyses as being
highly accurate projections of potential health benefits
expressed to two or more significant figures, sometimes
without any indication of uncertainty.
The quantification of health effects potentially associated
with various levels and forms of the Standards requires
several kinds of input. First and foremost, it requires some
knowledge of the nature of the concentration–response
relationships for various temporal metrics for the pollutant
in question. Typically, the response term is expressed as
excess risk per unit of increased concentration over some
range of ambient concentrations. The question then
becomes one of whether the relationship is linear and
whether there is a threshold level below which the
coefficient for excess risk does or does not hold. The issue
ofwhetherthereareorarenotthresholdsfornon-cancerhealth
endpoints is verycontentiousanda subjectofon-going debate
(White et al. 2009;R h o m b e r ge ta l .2011). A related issue
becomes the selection of suitable reference baseline statistics
for the particular health effects. An additional question
becomes the appropriate population to be evaluated—a
single city, multiple cities or the population of the United
States. It is obvious that there are substantial uncertainties
associated with each component of the analyses.
With the use of linear, no-threshold, concentration–
response models, the EPA has on some occasions calculated
estimated excess morbidity and mortality effects attribut-
able to the specific pollutant down to background concen-
trations. The Health Risk Assessment (EPA 2007b) and the
Regulatory Impact Analysis (EPA 2007d) for the 2008
Ozone NAAQS serve as examples. Further, dependent on
the assumptions made with regard to how ambient concen-
trations of the pollutant would change in response to
various levels and forms of the Standard, estimated health
effects avoided (i.e. health benefit) may be calculated. A
key consideration as to whether these benefits can be
realized relates to whether the roll-back in air concen-
trations that is assumed in the analysis as a result of
implementation of the new Standard can actually be
realized. In part, the validity of the analyses relate to how
realistic the assumptions have been with regard to back-
ground levels. A discussion of this issue for ozone can be
found in McClellan et al. (2009). Indeed, as the levels of
the Standards are ratcheted down toward background
levels, there is increasing uncertainty as to whether there
are any health effects attributable to single pollutants and
even greater uncertainty as to the magnitude of the health
benefits associated with any new lower Standard. The use
of single pollutant models for estimating benefits also raises
the issue of double-counting of benefits as the benefits of
the individual pollutants are aggregated.
Hence, the paradigm shift. It is apparent that in setting
the earliest NAAQS some individuals, including CASAC
members, envisioned that the Standards were being set at
levels protective of public health with an adequate margin
of safety based on threshold concentration–response models.
Inshort,iftherewerehealtheffectsatthelevelandformofthe
selected NAAQS, they were viewed as de minimis. In
contrast, more recent NAAQS have been set at levels which
the CASAC and EPA characterize as having residual health
effects even if the Standard were to be attained. The central
questionremains—howlowislowenough?Iviewtheanswer
as a policy judgment informed by science that can only be
made by the EPA Administrator.
Recent action on revision of the particulate matter
and ozone NAAQS
It is instructive to now turn our attention to the most recent
actions of EPA with regard to the revision of the PM
NAAQS in 2006 (EPA 2006b), the revision of the Ozone
NAAQS in 2008 (EPA 2008) and the “reconsideration”
proposal (EPA 2010a) for a further revision of the Ozone
NAAQS in 2011
In the initial discussion, I will focus on the EPA’s 2006
revision of the PM2.5 Standard. The science that informed
the setting of that Standard was summarized in a Criteria
Document (EPA 2004). This, in turn, provided the basis for
the Staff Paper (EPA 2005). The central issue was the level
and associated form of the two different averaging time
Standards, a 24-h averaging time and an annual Standard.
The first Standards using PM2.5 as an indicator were set in
1997 (EPA 1997a). The 24-h averaging time Standard was
set at 65 μg/m
3. The 24-h PM2.5 Standard of 65 μg/m
3 was
attained when the 3-year average of the 98th percentile of
the concentrations at each population-oriented monitor was
not exceeded. The Annual Standard was set at an annual
arithmetic mean of 15 μg/m
3. The annual Standard was
attained when the 3-year average of the weighted PM2.5
concentration from single or multiple community-oriented
monitors did not exceed 15 μg/m
3. Recall that the 1997
PM2.5 Standard was originally intended to supplement and,
inpart,replacethePM10 (annual arithmetic mean of 50 μg/m
3
and 24 h average of 150 μg/m
3) Standard set in 1987. That
PM10 Standard had replaced the earlier Total Suspended
Particulate Standard promulgated in 1971.
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provided advice on the setting of the PM2.5 Standard in
1997. There was much discussion about the uncertainty
associated with the shift from a PM10 to a PM2.5 Standard,
especially the uncertainty in a shift from dependence on
only the PM10 indicator to PM2.5 indicator. There was
strong scientific support for introducing the PM2.5 indicator,
although at the time, there was limited epidemiological data
from studies in which PM2.5 had actually been measured.
There was no clear scientific evidence on the presence or
absence of a threshold in the concentration–response
relationship for either acute or chronic responses. The big
issues related to the levels and associated form—“how low
was low enough?” The prevailing tone in hallway con-
versations focused on two points. First, it was argued that it
was important to introduce a PM2.5 indicator which, in turn,
would mandate the monitoring of PM2.5. The availability of
the PM2.5 monitoring data would then allow the conduct of
epidemiological studies to directly evaluate a potential
concentration–response association for this indicator. Sec-
ond, it was argued that in the absence of convincing data on
PM2.5 the final action contemplated by the Agency should
not represent a drastic increase in the stringency of the PM
Standard. In my opinion the new PM2.5 annual Standard set
at 15 μg/m
3 did increase the stringency of the PM Standard
and represented a policy judgment call on the part of the
Administrator that was very precautionary. In contrast, in
my opinion, the setting of PM2.5 24-h averaging time
Standard at 65 μg/m
3 was much less precautionary. The
level and form of the new Standards was as follows:
(1) The annual PM2.5 Standard is met when the 3-year
average of the annual arithmetic mean PM2.5 concen-
trations, from single or multiple community-oriented
monitors, is less than or equal to 15 μg/m
3, with
fractional parts of 0.05 or greater rounded up.
(2) The 24-h PM2.5 Standard is met when the 3-year
average of the 98th percentile of 24-h PM2.5 concen-
trations at each population-oriented monitor within an
area is less than or equal to 65 μg/m
3, with fractional
parts of 0.5 or greater rounded up.
(3) The form of the previous 24-h PM10 Standard is
revised to be based on the 3-year average of the 99th
percentile of 24-h PM10 concentrations at each
monitor within an area.
Review of the PM Standard that would lead to revision
of the 1997 PM Standard moved forward in the early
2000s. In 2004, as the new Criteria Document for PM was
reviewed, it was decided that the CASAC would abandon
CASAC’s practice of issuing “closure letters.”“ Closure
Letters” had traditionally been sent by the CASAC Chair to
the EPA Administrator at key junctures, such as completion
of revision of a Criteria Document or Staff Paper,
signifying the work product was scientifically acceptable
for regulatory decision-making. Some individuals had
viewed the “closure letters” as a way by which CASAC
impeded progress in the setting of NAAQS in a timely
manner.Iviewedthe“closureletters”asaneffectiveapproach
to ensuring that EPA was preparing documents that included
the latest scientific information and analyses, even if it
required the Agency to develop Revisions or Addendums.
AfterreviewingandcommentingontheCriteriaDocument
(EPA 2004) and Staff Paper (EPA 2005), CASAC recom-
mended that the 24-h PM2.5 Standard be set in the range of
25–35 μg/m
3 and the annual PM2.5 Standard be set in the
range of 13–14 μg/m
3 (Henderson 2005, 2006a; Table 1).
There was strong pressure within the CASAC PM Panel
to provide consensus advice to the Administrator. In the
end, two consultant members of the PM Panel who had
both served as Chair of CASAC (myself and another) did
not deem it appropriate to join with other members of the
Panel in endorsing the specific levels others wished to
recommend to the Administrator. I held strongly to the view
that the difference between leaving the Standard at 15 μg/
m
3 and reducing it to 14 μg/m
3 was not a scientific
decision, but rather a matter of policy judgment that should
be left to the discretion of the Administrator. In my opinion,
Administrator Johnson, as the politically responsible
decision-maker (using the words of John Bachmann 2007
in describing the 1974 Lead NAAQS decision) was not
bound by the recommendations of CASAC as they were an
advisory committee. In my opinion, the Administrator
alone had the authority to make policy judgment calls in
retaining or revising the annual PM2.5 Standard, then at
15 μg/m
3 and the 24-h PM2.5 Standard, then at 65 μg/m
3
(EPA 1997a). The Administrator issued a final rule with
the annual PM2.5 Standard retained at 15 μg/m
3 and the
24-h Standard reduced to 35 μg/m
3 (EPA 2006b).
Table 1 National ambient air quality standards for PM2.5 and ozone,
the old standard, CASAC recommendations and administrator’s final
rule
Indicator (unit) Old standard CASAC New standard
PM2.5—24 h (μg/m
3)6 5
a 30–35
b 35
c
Annual (μg/m
3)1 5
a 13–14
b 15
c
Ozone—8 h (ppb) 84
d 60–70
e 75
f
aEPA 1997a, b
bHenderson 2006a, b; Henderson et al. 2006c
cEPA 2006b
dEPA 1997a, b, set at 0.08 ppm which by rounding convention equals
84 ppb
eHenderson 2007, 2008
fEPA 2008
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the seven formal members of CASAC (Henderson et al.
2006c) sent a letter to the Administrator expressing concern
that the EPA Administrator had not decreased the PM2.5
Annual Standard from 15 μg/m
3 to 13–14 μg/m
3 in
combination with the setting of the 24-h Standard at
35 μg/m
3, the upper end of the ranges they had recom-
mended. In my view, the CASAC recommendation that the
Administrator had to reduce the annual Standard by at least
1 μg/m
3 indicated that the CASAC failed to appreciate that
the setting of any NAAQS involves policy judgments,
reserved by the CAA to the EPA Administrator, informed
by the science. Presumably, the CASAC would have found
it acceptable if the Administrator had reduced the Annual
PM2.5 Standard from 15 to 14 μg/m
3, or even to 13 μg/m
3.
Perhaps it would be useful for me to elaborate on why I
think it is not appropriate for CASAC to recommend a
bright line upper bound on the NAAQS, even assuming no
change in the statistical form of the Standard. The
Committee, when commenting on the science under-
girding the Standard, had noted that it had not identified a
threshold in the ambient exposure concentration–response
relationship for PM2.5. Consistent with this assessment of
the science, the EPA in its Risk Assessment had used a
linear exposure concentration–response model to estimate
risk that would be avoided and risks that would remain if
the Standards were set at various specific levels and with an
assumed statistical form. There were estimated risks
associated with retaining the Standard at 15 μg/m
3 and
reducing it to 14 or 13 μg/m
3. By endorsing a level of
14 μg/m
3 for the annual Standard, the CASAC was
indicating its support for setting the Standard at a particular
level of estimated risk. In my opinion, a decision on
acceptable risk (i.e., the residual risk level when the
Standard is attained) is a policy decision left to the
discretion of the EPA Administrator under the authority of
the CAA. The Committee’s blended scientific and policy
judgment advice would have been clearer if they had stated
their specific advice by indicating both the specific
numerical level and the associated morbidity and mortality.
Of course, the estimates of morbidity and mortality should
have had an indication of the associated uncertainties.
Let us now turn to revision of the Ozone NAAQS. Final
action on revision of the Ozone Standard set in 1997 (EPA
1997b) followed almost 2 years after the decision on the
PM2.5 Standard. The ozone review included a Criteria
Document (EPA 2006c) which summarized publications
through 2005. This document served as the basis for a
subsequent staff paper (EPA 2007a) and risk assessment
(EPA 2007b). Again, CASAC (Henderson 2006b, 2007)
offered very prescriptive advice on the level of the Standard
indicating that the level of the revised 8-h averaging time
Standard should be lowered to no greater than 0.070 ppm
down from the 1997 Standard of 0.08 ppm which by
rounding convention was effectively 0.084 ppm. The 1997
Standard is met when the 4th highest 8-h average value
over a 3-year period does not exceed 0.084 ppm (Table 1).
The CASAC letter on the Ozone Staff Paper (Henderson
2007) commented on policy relevant background (PRB)
noting “the Final Ozone Staff Paper does not provide a
sufficient base of evidence from the peer-reviewed litera-
ture to suggest that the current approach to determining a
PRB is the best method to make this estimation.” The letter
concludes with the statement—“Thus, PRB is irrelevant to
the discussion of where along the concentration–response
function a NAAQS with an averaging time that provides
enhanced public health protection should be.” The CASAC
apparently failed to appreciate that identification of scien-
tifically valid levels for PRB for different sections of the
country can have a profound influence on realizable public
health benefits (see discussion in McClellan et al. 2009)
and the calculated benefit and residual risks for various
levels and forms of the Standards.
As the Agency’s activities on revision of the Ozone
NAAQS were proceeding, I participated in June 2007 with
a small group of scientists at a meeting held in Rochester,
NY to discuss critical considerations in evaluating scientific
evidence of health effects of ambient ozone. The discus-
sions at the Rochester Conference focused on the scientific
interpretation of the data available on the health effects of
exposure to ambient concentrations of ozone, controlled
ozone exposure studies with human volunteers, long-term
epidemiological studies, time-series epidemiological
studies, human panel studies, and toxicological inves-
tigations. The deliberations also dealt with the issue of
background levels of ozone of non-anthropogenic origin
and issues involved with conducting formal risk assess-
ment of the health impacts of current and prospective
levels of ambient ozone. The participants, while offering
comments on the science informing the revision of the
Ozone NAAQS, did not feel it appropriate to offer policy
judgments on the level and form of the Ozone NAAQS
then under consideration. A report based on the Rochester
Conference has been published (McClellan et al. 2009). The
deliberations at the Rochester Conference were summarized
and included with my comments (McClellan 2007)s u b m i t t e d
to the EPA Ozone Docket on the proposed Ozone Standard
(EPA 2007c).
Administrator Johnson, in March 2008 (EPA 2008),
issued a final revised Standard for Ozone with the primary
8-h average Standard set at 75 ppb retaining the statistical
form the same as the 1997 primary Standard—the Standard
is attained when the fourth highest 8-h average value over a
3-year period does not exceed 75 ppb. The CASAC was
displeased with the policy judgment of Administrator
Johnson to set the Standard at 75 ppb rather than heeding
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0.060–0.070 ppm (Henderson 2008). As an aside, Admin-
istrator Johnson also decided to set the secondary Standard
for Ozone equal to the primary Standard. In doing so, he
did not heed CASAC’s advice to set a secondary Standard
with a different cumulative form. The CASAC had
recommended a sigmoidally weighted W126 index, accu-
mulated over 12 “daylight” hours and over at least the three
maximum ozone months of the summer growing season
(Henderson 2008).
Some CASAC members have argued that by giving the
EPA Administrator a range (0.060–0.070 ppm), the
CASAC had not taken away the Administrator’s discretion
in making policy judgments on the level and form of the
NAAQS. To the contrary, I argue that the upper value in the
range is in effect a bright line that CASAC has indicated the
Administrator should not go above based on the science. In
short, under the new paradigm, CASAC has defined for the
Administrator the upper level of excess risk that CASAC
deems acceptable, even though they have not clearly
identified the specific health risk level associated with the
0.070 ppm level.
I firmly believe that Administrator Johnson’s decisions
on both the primary and secondary ozone Standards were
consistent with the legislative authority accorded the
Administrator under the CAA. Much was made of the fact
that in the setting of the Ozone Standards, discussions took
place between White House staff and, perhaps then
President Bush, as the Standard was finalized. This is
hardly surprising. Recall Bachmann (2007) recounted the
discussions between President Clinton and Administrator
Browner in 1997 and the draft memo to EPA Administrator
Browner prepared by EPA staff for ultimate issuance over
the signature of President Clinton (Clinton 1997).
As soon as President Obama was sworn in on January
20, 2009, the then-White House Chief of Staff, Rahm
Emanuel, issued a memorandum (Emanuel 2009) stating
—“It is important that President Obama’s appointees and
designees have the opportunity to review and approve any
new or pending regulations.” The Emanuel memorandum
then proceeded to outline explicit conditions for what
qualified as new or pending regulations—for example, “all
proposed or final regulations that have not been published
in the Federal Register” and “consider extending for 60 days
the effective date of regulations that have been published in
the Federal Register but not yet taken effect.” The revised
NAAQS for ambient ozone, published in the Federal
Register, March 12, 2008 (EPA 2008), could hardly be
viewed as new or pending in January 2009. Indeed, in the
fall of 2008, the EPA had already initiated action on the
next review of the Ozone NAAQS (Martin 2008). In
initiating the new review, it was noted that CASAC advice
on the previous review of the Standard represented “a
mixture of scientific and policy considerations.” Nonethe-
less, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson in late 2009, decided
to proceed with “reconsideration” of the final Ozone
NAAQSruleissuedinMarch2008(EPA2008). The decision
to proceed with a “reconsideration” proposal was formally
announced in the Federal Register in January 2010 (EPA
2010a). The “reconsideration” proposal noted—“With
respect to CASAC’s recommended range of standard
levels, EPA observed that the basis for CASAC’s
recommendation appears to be a mixture of scientific
and policy consideration.”
Administrator Jackson has stated that the “reconsidera-
tion” rule will be based on the same record used to propose
the 2008 Standard, essentially the scientific information
available through late 2005 and included in the 2006
Criteria Document (EPA 2006a). Recall the earlier dis-
cussion of EPA moving to a formal rulemaking process at
the insistence of the Court. The approach of using the “old
scientific record” was apparently taken with a view that it
offered a “fast track” to a revision of the Ozone Standard
without creating a new record. The “reconsideration”
proposal (EPA 2010a) states that consideration will be
given to setting the primary Standard set in the range of 60
to 70 ppb. The announced date for release of the final
“reconsideration” Standard has continually shifted from
August 2010 to October 2010 to December 2010 to July
2011. In accord with the review plan laid out in October
2008, the EPA staff proceeded with preparation of the
Integrated Science Assessment reviewing the new scientific
information to be considered in the next 5-year review
triggered by promulgation of the March 2008 Ozone
NAAQS. Ironically, the Integrated Science Assessment, the
document replacing the old criteria document, for ozone, was
released on March 2, 2011 (EPA 2011a), all while EPA’s
reconsideration of the old record remains pending.
I offered comments (McClellan 2010a) on the appropri-
ateness of the Administrator proceeding with a “reconsid-
eration” Standard for ozone and offered comments
(McClellan 2010b) to the EPA Ozone Docket on the
specifics of the proposal. In my view, the proposal for the
Administrator to reconsider a rulemaking, the setting of a
NAAQS, formally completed 9 months earlier by the
previous Administrator in another Administration is with-
out precedent. It has the potential to serve as a bad
precedent with every change in Presidential Administration
triggering a review of actions completed by the previous
Administration with a view to potentially reconsidering the
rules. In short, the new Administrator is saying “if I had
been in office before I was appointed, I would have made a
different policy judgment call.” Administrator Jackson’su s e
of the CASAC position in 2008 to justify the “reconsidera-
tion” action, in my opinion, moves CASAC out of its
scientific advisory role into a strategic, policy-driving
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Johnson, in issuing the 2008 Standard, had noted (perhaps
with trepidation) that the CASAC recommendation “appears
tobeamixtureofscientificandpolicyconsiderations,”avi ew
informed by EPA staff analysis (Martin 2008). I agree with
the assessment that CASAC, in recommending specific
levels, is on a path of mixing scientific interpretations with
policy judgments.
Administrator Jackson, in early 2011 (EPA 2011b),
called on the CASAC to offer further clarification of the
views it expressed earlier. The specific advice being
solicited by the Administrator from CASAC is detailed in
a memorandum from Lydia Wegman, Office of Air Quality
Planning and Standards to CASAC (Wegman 2011). Many
of the questions appear to be directed at attempting to
distinguish between CASAC’s interpretation of the old
science and the policy judgments that resulted in CASAC’s
60–70 ppb recommended range for the Standard. It proved
challenging for CASAC to address these questions based
only on the “old record” of pre-2006 science while ignoring
the new scientific information on ozone (Samet 2011).
The substantial new scientific information on ozone that
has been published in the 5 years since the Criteria
Document (EPA 2006c) was prepared is documented in
the recently released Integrated Science Assessment (EPA
2011b). The current drama over the “reconsideration”
ozone rule has the potential to damage the credibility of
CASAC by drawing it more tightly into the “regulatory
web of policy judgments” that are the exclusive dominion
of the Administrator under the authority of the CAA. My
advice (McClellan 2011)t ot h eA d m i n i s t r a t o ra n d
CASAC was to withdraw the “reconsideration” proposal
a n da s kC A S A Ct oe x p e d i t i o u s l yp r o c e e dw i t hr e v i e wo f
the new science now available in the Integrated Science
Assessment (EPA 2011a).
Call for sound science
Over the last several decades, there have been increasingly
loud calls from multiple quarters for using “sound science”
to make regulatory decisions such as the setting of
NAAQS. The call has come from both Non-Government
Organizations (NGOs) representing multiple sectors, from
Industry and from the scientific community. In my opinion,
all of these groups and the individuals within them have
difficulty separating the science from their policy-driven
preferred outcomes. As a scientist and as a citizen, I
strongly support the use of all the available scientific
information to inform public policy decisions. In general, I
think the efforts of individuals and organizations to
critically review and synthesize relevant scientific informa-
tion for the various Agency rulemaking activities has had a
positive impact. This includes the situations in which
original scientific data files were made available (actions
that I applaud) and re-analyses conducted. Indeed, I think
more such analyses should be conducted, especially
when the original data were acquired with public
funding. By the same token, I would urge industry
groups to make available to other investigators data
acquired under industry sponsorship.
What I decry, however, is the desire by some to label
certain reviews or analyses as either “acceptable” or “dead
on arrival” based on the source of funding without regard to
scientific quality of the review or analyses. Over my career,
I have encountered exceptionally high-quality reviews and
analyses performed by scientists in academic, industrial,
and environmental organizations with sponsorship from
government, NGOs, and industry. I have also noted some
reviews and analyses from these same quarters that I
thought were of inferior scientific quality. In my opinion,
scientific quality and rigor is not defined by the source of
funding for the work.
I have great concern that the advocates of “sound
science,” be it NGO, academics or industry, may have
unrealistic expectations as to what “sound science” can
deliver. Sound science does not in and of itself make for
sound decisions. As I have noted in this paper, science
alone cannot identify an acceptable level of health risk,
since such levels inherently represent a policy judgment
call. Sound science can only inform what are ultimately
policy judgments or political decisions. This is especially
the case for the setting of NAAQS, in the absence of a
clearly defined threshold, which involve decisions as to
acceptable health risks which are linked to the level
(and form) of the Standard.
Setting NAAQS at acceptable levels of risk
Let us now return to the critical issue of “how low is low
enough?” for setting a specific NAAQS. It is apparent that
the body of science on any given criteria pollutant today is
such that it is difficult to argue that the current Standards, if
attained, would result in a world that is free of any risk of
adverse effects from air pollution on the populations of the
United States. As Justice Breyer wrote, we live in a world
that is not free of all risk. I draw guidance from Justice
Breyer’s statement on his interpretation of the words of the
CAA—“They permit the Administrator to take account of
comparative health consequences. They allow her to take
account of context when determining the acceptability of
small risks to health. And they give her considerable
discretion when she does so.” The “her” in Justice
Breyer’s opinion is a reference to past EPA Administrator
Christine Whitman.
However, in my opinion, the discretion that Justice
Breyer assigns to the EPA Administrator does not extend to
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Each of the individuals serving on CASAC may be an
extraordinarily competent scientist or engineer or have
other specialized knowledge of air quality and its health and
environmental effects. Because of this special expertise,
these individuals have a special role in interpreting the
scientific knowledge that the Administrator will use in
making policy judgments on the level and form of the
Standard recognizing that the level and form, in turn,
determine the level of acceptable risk that it is estimated
Society will bear for that specific pollutant.
As broadly knowledgeable health and environmental
scientists, CASAC members are in a unique position to
offer advice to the Administrator that will provide the
“comparative health consequences” context that Justice
Breyer has called for in his opinion. For example, it would
be refreshing if CASAC members were to more broadly
draw on their experience as health specialists. In doing so,
when debate begins on the public health significance of an
excess risk of 0.1 for some health endpoint per 10 ppb
increase in ozone at 60, 70, or 80 ppb averaged over 8 h,
they could offer comments on the multiple factors that
influence the health risks for that endpoint. This discussion,
in my opinion, should even be extended to recognize that
complex factors such as the socio-economic status of
individuals have a profound influence on health (Table 2;
Steenland et al. 2004). I will readily admit that differences
in air quality associated with socio-economic status may have
a role in the differences reported by Steenland et al. (2004)
and other investigators. However, that admission does not
serve as a basis for not providing scientific context to
decisions on “how low is low enough” in setting NAAQS.
I suspect that this was the kind of input Administrator
Bill Ruckelshaus was seeking when he noted in 1983 that a
decision on the PM Standard “could not be made solely on
science, and asked if under the statute “is there room to
consider other non-scientific factors in making the major
social policy judgment of picking a precise number from
a range of scientifically justified values” (Bachmann
2007). Justice Breyer has answered former Administrator
Ruckelshaus’ question in the affirmative. Indeed, Justice
Breyer has recommended the use of comparative health
consequences as a context for Standard setting. In doing
so, he has indicated that the boundaries of the relevant
science for setting a NAAQS are not restricted exclusively
to the health effects of the specific pollutant under
consideration. This common sense approach has not been
evident in many of the recent CASAC deliberations or the
policy judgments of the Administration.
Conclusions
The United States now has nearlya halfcentury ofexperience
of improving air quality under the federal statute, the Clean
Air Act,firstenacted in1963. The amendmentsof1970, 1977
and 1990 substantially strengthened the CAA. Remarkable
progress has been made in improving air quality as assessed
using multiple criterion. The establishment of National
Ambient Air Quality Standards for criteria pollutants by the
EPAandtheimplementationprogramsoftheindividualStates
have contributed significantly to that success. Every decade
from1970tothe present has seenmajor actions withregardto
the NAAQS and, in general, more stringent Standards. In
many instances, Standards have been attained or nearly
attained, and then a new more stringent Standard has been
introduced.Assomehavesaid, wewerealmostthere and then
they moved the goal posts, i.e. lowered the Standards.
Now, more than at any time in the past, the policy
judgment question must be asked “How low is low
enough?” for each of the NAAQS. In my opinion, the
guidance of Justice Breyer provides the Administrator
broad latitude to make policy judgments consistent with
our common goal of enhancing the health of all Americans.
Whatever path is chosen to go forward, there will
remain a need for policy judgments informed by the best
available scientific information. In creating new scientific
information, I urge scientists to think broadly and adopt
a strong comparative health benefit orientation. For
example, when conducting epidemiological investiga-
tions, include multiple air pollutants and other factors,
including socio-economic status that may influence the
health endpoints being evaluated. Then report on all of
the tested associations, not just the results for a single air
pollutant. The resulting broader base of knowledge will
allow Society to make decisions as to what actions will
yield the most improvement in health at the lowest net
cost to Society.
Table 2 The impact of socio-economic status on mortality (Steenland
et al. 2004)
Mortality Men Women
All causes 2.02 (1.95–209)
a 1.29 (1.25–1.32)
Heart disease 1.88 (1.83–1.93) 1.84 (1.76–1.93)
Stroke 2.25 (2.14–2.37) 1.53 (1.44–1.62)
Diabetes 2.19 (2.07–2.32) 1.85 (1.72–2.00)
COPD 3.59 (3.35–3.83) 2.09 (1.91–2.30)
Lung cancer 2.15 (2.07–2.23) 1.31 (1.25–1.39)
Breast cancer − 0.76 (0.73–0.79)
Colorectal cancer 1.21 (1.16–1.27) 0.91 (0.86–0.96)
External causes 2.67 (2.58–2.78) 1.41 (1.35–1.48)
Mortality rate ratio ¼
Lowest quartrile
Highest quartrile of socioeconomical status
a95% confidence interval
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ments are prepared, I urge that they include information
that will help put the reported health effects of the
specific pollutant in context. One approach to this might
be the development of a generic document that reviews
current knowledge on the multiple factors that influence
morbidity and mortality from respiratory and cardiovas-
cular disease, the major health outcomes for key criteria
pollutants. This information could then be used in
multiple Policy Assessment Documents. Both the Inte-
grated Science Assessment and Policy Assessment Docu-
ments should more clearly identify and characterize the
health effects role of the specific pollutant under
consideration as well as the role of co-pollutants and
other factors influencing the health outcomes evaluated.
Policy Assessment Documents need to include “determi-
nate criterion for drawing lines” as called for by the DC
Circuit Court in its American Trucking Associations v. EPA
(1999) opinion. These are needed to provide a clearer basis
for the Administrator’s policy judgments on the level and
form of the Standard. These criteria, along with a strong
comparative health context, should provide an improved
basis for the Administrator’s policy decisions.
I also strongly urge the CASAC to focus on the scientific
rigor of the scientific content and analyses in the Integrated
Science Assessment and Policy Assessment Document, and
avoid the temptation of offering policy judgments as to a
specific upper-bound level and form of the Standard or
what they view as acceptable ranges. If CASAC cannot
avoid this temptation to stay out of the “policy judgment
thicket,” then it needs to be clear as to the specific scientific
knowledge that informs their personal policy preferences.
CASAC is required to comment to the Administrator under
CAA § 109(d)(2)(B) “on any new national ambient air
quality Standards and revisions of existing criteria or
Standards as may be appropriate.” However, in offering
comments, CASAC needs to very carefully articulate where
CASAC scientific interpretations leave off and CASAC
policy judgments begin. Moreover, it is important for EPA
Administrators to recognize they need not be bound by
CASAC’s specific policy preferences or range of policy
preference outcomes. While the CASAC members are
citizens and are certainly entitled, just like any citizen, to
have personal preferences as to policy outcomes, CASAC
members, acting in that role, should not view themselves as
broadly representative of Society at large.
It is critically important that EPA Administrators
recognize, as Administrator William Ruckelshaus so clearly
did in 1983, that Standards cannot be set solely on science
and that the ultimate decision on a level and form of a
Standard necessarily reflects policy judgments. Adminis-
trators should not seek to find “scientific cover” for these
policy judgments in the deliberations offered by CASAC. If
this is done, it has the potential to transform the Clean Air
Scientific Advisory Committee into a de facto Clean Air
Standards Setting Committee, thereby usurping the policy
role of the Administrator. I do not think that is consistent
with the language of the CAA. The Administrator, as a
public official appointed by the President and confirmed by
the Senate, is expected to have a broad perspective
reflective of all of Society, not just a specific scientific
constituency, when making policy judgments in setting
National Ambient Air Quality Standards.
Declaration of Interest I have participated, beginning in the mid-
1970s, as a member of numerous CASAC Panels providing advice to
the EPA Administrator on the setting of the NAAQS for all the criteria
pollutants. I served as Chair of CASAC in 1988–1992 when the
debate began on shifting the averaging time for the ozone Standard
from 1 to 8 h. I served on the CASAC PM Panels that provided advice
on the PM2.5 Standards promulgated in 1997 and 2006. I served on the
CASAC Ozone Panel that provided advice on the Standard promul-
gated in 1997. I did not serve on the CASAC Ozone Panel that
provided advice to the EPA Administrator on the Standard promul-
gated in 2008. However, I did follow that activity closely and offered
comments to CASAC and EPA on the science informing the
Administrator’s judgments on the Ozone NAAQS. The views I share
in this paper are my own professional views based on three decades of
experience participating in the NAAQS setting process. I regularly
serve as an advisor to both public and private organizations on air
quality issues. This includes the American Petroleum Institute (API)
and various companies in the energy and transportation sectors. The
views I have expressed are not necessarily those of the API or any
organization I advise.
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